Consistent with the Authorization for Use

of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution

(Public Law 102–1) and as part of my effort

to keep the Congress fully informed, I am

reporting on the status of efforts to obtain

Iraq’s compliance with the resolutions adopted

by the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC). This report covers the period from

November 26, 1997, to the present.

My last report included the U.N.-Iraq

stand-off which began on October 29, 1997,

when the Iraqi government announced its intention

to expel all U.S. personnel working

in Iraq for the U.N. Special Commission

(UNSCOM). Iraq’s apparent aim was to

force UNSCOM’s withdrawal or to significantly

restrict its ability to function effectively

and independently, thereby establishing

an environment under which Iraq could

restore its capacity to develop weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) without restriction.

In November, the members of the U.N. Security

Council thwarted this effort through

joint diplomacy and the use of Secretary

Council resolutions—backed by the deployment

of forces in the Gulf. This resulted in

the Iraqi government’s explicit commitment,

on November 20, 1997, to allow UNSCOM

inspectors, including those who are U.S. citizens,

to return unhindered to their duties.

In violation of that commitment and of

U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)

687 and subsequent resolutions, including

707, 1134, and 1137, Iraq has attempted

again to dictate the composition of

UNSCOM inspection teams and the terms

of its compliance with Council resolutions.

In addition, Iraq has persisted in its efforts

to defy the Council by unilaterally imposing

unacceptable conditions on the operations of

UNSCOM. This report covering the last 60

days reflects the failure of the Government

of Iraq to live up to its obligations under all

applicable UNSC resolutions and its continued

hindrance of UNSCOM’s work.

In December 1997, the Iraqi government

reiterated its longstanding refusal to allow

any access to all so-called ‘‘Presidential’’ sites,

and said it would limit access to so-called

‘‘sensitive’’ sites by UNSCOM inspectors.

On January 5, 1998, an inert rocket-propelled

grenade struck a building in Baghdad

that houses various U.N. elements, including

UNSCOM headquarters, but caused no injuries.

The Iraqi government denied responsibility

but has yet to arrest any suspects.

On January 12, the Government of Iraq

refused to cooperate with an UNSCOM inspection

team, declaring that the team was

dominated by too many ‘‘Anglo-Saxons’’. The

team had been investigating, among other

things, allegations that Iraq may have used

human beings as experimental subjects in

chemical and biological warfare development.

On January 17, the Iraqi government declared

a Jihad (holy war) against U.N. sanctions

and called for 1 million Iraqi citizens

to undergo military training to prepare for

any consequences.

During the last 60 days, UNSCOM

launched two special inspection teams that

once again targeted Iraq’s ‘‘Concealment

Mechanism’’ in order to ferret out WMD

programs and documents that UNSCOM—

and we—believe Iraq stubbornly retains. It

became clear that the Iraqis had no intention

of cooperating with these inspections as specifically

called for in the most recent

UNSCRs on the topic—Resolutions 1134 of

October 23 and 1137 of November 12. The

teams were stopped *en route,* denied access,

and prevented from video-taping equipment

movement or document-destruction activity

at suspect sites.

Ambassador Butler, UNSCOM’s Executive

Director, traveled to Baghdad on December

12, 1997, and again on January 19,

1998, to attempt to obtain Iraqi assurance

that UNSCOM can resume its work

unhindered, including unfettered access to

‘‘Presidential’’ and ‘‘sensitive’’ sites. Following

the January 19 meetings, the Iraqis continued

to defy and challenge UNSCOM by

refusing to discuss access to ‘‘Presidential’’

sites until after Technical Meeting talks have

concluded in April. As Ambassador Butler reported

to the Security Council on January

22, the talks were characterized by moments

‘‘of abuse and denunciation of UNSCOM

and its professional officers; an attempt to

apportion literally all blame to UNSCOM,

past and present, for the fact that the disarmament

task has not been completed and

sanctions on Iraq remained in force.’’

Throughout, the UNSC has expressed its

support for UNSCOM and its mission in five

unanimous Presidential Statements since October

1997.

This record of intransigence is only the latest

chapter in the long history of efforts by

the Iraqi regime to flout its obligations under

relevant UNSC resolutions. Without full disclosure

and free access to all sites UNSCOM

and the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) wish to inspect, the ongoing monitoring

and verification mandated by relevant

UNSC resolutions, including Resolutions

687, 707 and 715, cannot effectively be conducted.

UNSCOM must be allowed to continue

to investigate all of Iraq’s programs

until it can verify with absolute certainty that

all the equipment has been destroyed and

that all the capabilities have been eliminated.

Otherwise, Iraq eventually will be free to develop

the capacity to strike at any city in the

Middle East, delivering biological, chemical

and possibly even nuclear weapons.

Iraqi biological and chemical weapons are

currently the most troubling issues for

UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dualuse

nature of the technology: biological and

chemical agents can easily be hidden within

civilian sectors, such as the pharmaceutical

and pesticide industries. Iraq continues to

prevent full and immediate access to sites

suspected of chemical or biological warfare

activities. UNSCOM is still unable to verify

that all of Iraq’s SCUD missile warheads

filled with biological agents—anthrax and

botulinum toxin—have been destroyed.

The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM

and the IAEA should ‘‘close the books’’ on

nuclear and missile inspections, but there are

still many uncertainties and questions that

need to be resolved. Iraq has failed to answer

critical questions on nuclear weapons design

and fabrication, procurement, and centrifuge

enrichment; to provide a written description

of its post-war nuclear weapons procurement

program; and to account for major engine

components, special warheads, missing propellants,

and guidance instruments that could

be used to assemble fully operational missiles.

The U.S. has led international efforts to

secure UNSCOM the access and cooperation

it must have to do its job. As a demonstration

of our resolve, the aircraft carriers USS NIMITZ,

USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, their

accompanying battle group combatant ships,

and additional combat aircraft have remained

in the region. On January 15, the Government

of the United Kingdom dispatched the

aircraft carrier HMS INVINCIBLE and escort

ships to the Gulf via the Red Sea.

United States force levels in the region include

land- and carrier-based aircraft, surface

warships, a Marine amphibious task force, a

Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion

task force, and a mix of special operations

forces deployed in support of

USCINCCENT operations. To enhance

force protection throughout the region, additional

military security personnel have been

deployed for continuous rotation.

USCINCCENT continues to monitor closely

the security situation in the region to ensure

adequate force protection is provided for all

deployed forces.

The U.S. and its coalition partners continue

to enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq

under Operation Northern Watch and Operation

Southern Watch. In response to a series

of Iraqi no-fly zone violations in October and

November 1997, we increased the number

of aircraft participating in these operations.

There have been no observed no-fly zone

violations during the period covered by this

report. We have repeatedly made clear to the

Government of Iraq and to all other relevant

parties that the U.S. and its partners will continue

to enforce both no-fly zones.

United Nations Security Council Resolution

949, adopted in October 1994, demands

that Iraq not use its military or any other

forces to threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations

in Iraq and that it not redeploy troops

or enhance its military capacity in southern

Iraq. In view of Saddam’s accumulating

record of brutality and unreliability, it is prudent

to retain a significant U.S. force presence

in the region to deter Iraq and respond

rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression or threats

against its neighbors.

We again take note of and welcome H.

Res. 322 of November 13, 1997, expressing

the sense of the House that the U.S. should

act to resolve the crisis in a manner that

assures full Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions

regarding the destruction of Iraq’s

capability to produce and deliver WMD.

While the increased forces in the region give

us a wide range of military options we remain

committed to exhausting all diplomatic options

before resorting to other alternatives.

United Nations sanctions against Iraq were

imposed as the result of Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait. It has been necessary to maintain

them because of Iraq’s failure to comply with

all relevant UNSC resolutions, including

those ensuring the destruction, removal, or

rendering harmless of Iraq’s WMD.

The Iraqi regime continues to insist on the

need for rapid lifting of the sanctions regime,

despite its record of noncompliance with its

obligations under relevant resolutions, out of

alleged concern for the well-being of the

Iraqi people, claiming that malnutrition and

inadequate medical care are the direct result

of internationally imposed sanctions.

To the contrary, since their inception, the

sanctions against Iraq have exempted food

and medicines—evidence of the concern of

the U.S. and the international community for

the welfare of the Iraqi people. In August

1991, when Iraq claimed that it was unable

to pay for its food needs, the Security Council

adopted UNSCR 706 (and later 712), authorizing

Iraq to sell limited amounts of petroleum

on the international market, with the

proceeds to be used to purchase humanitarian

supplies and to fund vital U.N. activities

regarding Iraq. The Government of Iraq,

however, ignored the needs of its own people

by refusing to accept UNSCR’s 706 and 712.

In April 1995 the Security Council proposed

a new oil-for-food offer to Iraq in

UNSCR 986, sponsored by the U.S. and others.

UNSCR 986 authorized the sale of up

to $1 billion of oil every 90 days for a total

of $2 billion during a 180-day period for Iraq

to purchase food, medicines, and other ‘‘humanitarian

items’’ for its people, and to fund

specified U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The

Government of Iraq delayed implementation

of UNSCR 986 for a year and a half, until

December 1996.

Since December 1996, the Iraqi regime

has continued to obstruct and delay the relief

plan. The regime delayed oil sales for two

months in June and July 1997 under the second

phase of the program (UNSCR 1111),

and again for over one month in December

1997 and January 1998 under the third phase

(UNSCR 1143).

The United States has consistently made

clear our openness to improving the oil-forfood

program to better meet the essential

needs of Iraq’s civilian population. The Secretary

General has just submitted a report

to this effect to the Council. We are prepared

to consider carefully and favorably the Secretary

General’s suggestions to improve and

expand the program. Expanding 986 would

serve our humanitarian and strategic interests.

First, the sanctions regime is aimed at

the threat Saddam poses—not the Iraqi people.

We should do whatever we can to ease

their plight, consistent with our interests.

Second, expanding 986 will make it more difficult

for Saddam to use the plight of his people

as a propaganda card in the Middle East

and so help us shore up the anti-Saddam coalition.

Third, by expanding oil-for-food, we

will broaden and strengthen the U.N.’s grip

on Iraq’s revenues and expenditures, tightening

the leash on Saddam and making it more

difficult for him to divert funds to the military

and WMD.

Implementation of UNSCR 1051 continues.

It provides for a mechanism to monitor

Iraq’s efforts to reacquire proscribed weapons

capabilities by requiring Iraq to notify

a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit in advance of

any imports of dual-use items. Similarly,

U.N. members must provide timely notification

of exports to Iraq of dual-use items.

The Multinational Interception Force

(MIF), operating under the authority of

UNSCR 665, is aggressively enforcing U.N.

sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the

single largest component of this international

naval force, augmented by ships and aircraft

from Australia, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands,

New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Member states of the Gulf Cooperation

Council support the MIF by providing

logistical support and shipriders who ensure

that merchant ships do not deviate from their

recorded courses to legal ports and by pulling

vessels caught violating sanctions into member

state ports.

Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted

five sanctions violators in the Gulf.

Ships involved in smuggling often utilize the

territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections.

We have given detailed reports of these

illegal activities to the U.N. Sanctions Committee

in New York.

The volume of illegal smuggling of petroleum

products from Iraq continues to increase.

Iraq is working to improve loading

facilities in the Shatt Al Arab waterway and

the continuing cooperation of the smugglers

with Iran frustrates the naval forces which

are restricted to international waters to carry

out their duties. We estimate that over

200,000 metric tons of gasoil and other petroleum

cargoes leave Iraq illegally each month.

Profits from this illegal trade support Saddam

at the expense of the Iraqi people.

The United Nations Compensation Commission

(UNCC), established pursuant to

UNSCR 687 and 692, continues to resolve

claims against Iraq arising from Iraq’s unlawful

invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The

UNCC has issued almost 1.3 million awards

worth approximately $6 billion. Thirty percent

of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted

by UNSCR’s 986, 1111, and 1143

have been allocated to the Compensation

Fund to pay awards and to finance operations

of the UNCC. To the extent that money is

available in the Compensation Fund, initial

payments to each claimant are authorized for

awards in the order in which the UNCC has

approved them, in installments of $2,500. To

date, 455 U.S. claimants have received an initial

installment payment, and payment is in

process for an additional 323 U.S. claimants.

The human rights situation throughout

Iraq continues to be cause for grave concern.

Reports that the Government of Iraq used

humans as experimental subjects in its chemical

and biological weapons programs have

been noted above. Credible reports from numerous,

independent sources indicate that

the Government of Iraq also may have summarily

executed anywhere from 800 to 1500

political detainees in November and December

1997. Opposition groups have alleged

that many of those killed were serving sentences

of 15–20 years for such crimes as insulting

the regime or membership in an opposition

political party. Max van der Stoel,

Special Rapporteur for Iraq for the U.N.

Human Rights Commission and Bacre

Ndiaye, the Commission’s Special

Rapporteur for Summary Executions, are investigating

these reports.

Iraq’s repression of its Shi’a population

continues, with policies that are destroying

the Marsh Arabs’ way of life in southern Iraq

and the ecology of the southern marshes.

Iraq continues to stall and obfuscate rather

than work in good faith toward accounting

for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country

nationals who disappeared during or after the

occupation of Kuwait, and nearly 5,000 Iranian

prisoners of war captured by Iraq during

the Iran-Iraq war. The Government of Iraq

shows no sign of complying with UNSCR

688, which demands that Iraq cease the repression

of its own people. The U.N. Human

Rights Commission’s Special Rapporteur on

Iraq reported to the General Assembly his

particular concern that extra-judicial, summary

or arbitrary executions and the practice

of torture continue to occur in Iraq.

Led by various independent Iraqi opposition

groups and nongovernmental organizations,

the INDICT campaign—which seeks

to document crimes against humanity and

other violations of international humanitarian

law committed by the Iraqi regime—continues

to gain momentum.

Regarding northern Iraq, the cease-fire

between the Kurdish parties, established November

24, 1997, as the result of U.S. efforts,

continues to hold. In recent weeks, both

Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan

Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani,

leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

(PUK) have made positive, forward-looking

statements on political reconciliation, which

may signal a willingness to settle some of

their differences. We will continue our efforts

to reach a permanent settlement

through mediation in order to help the people

of northern Iraq find the permanent, stable

accommodation which they deserve, and

to minimize the opportunities for Baghdad

and Tehran to insert themselves into the conflict

and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region.

The Peace Monitoring Force—sponsored by

the U.S., Great Britain and Turkey under the

Ankara process and comprising Iraqi

Turkomans and Assyrians—remains in garrison.

Iraq remains a serious threat to international

peace and security. As I told the

American people in my recent State of the

Union address, our country is united in its

view that Saddam Hussein cannot defy the

will of the world. He has used weapons of

mass destruction before. We are determined

to deny him the capacity to use them again.

I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully

with all of its obligations under U.N. Security

Council resolutions.

I appreciate the support of the Congress

for our efforts and shall continue to keep the

Congress informed about this important

issue.